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DRIVING OUT BAD MEDICINE: How STATE
REGULATION IMPACTS THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF ABORTION
STEVEN H. ADEN, EsQ.*
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Activists on both sides of the debate over legal abortion rely extensively
on medical and sociological research regarding the impact of abortion and its
regulation in the states.' But until recently, this debate has not enjoyed the
benefit of a large and growing body of economic research on the impact of
state legislation restricting or promoting abortion. This article first offers a
* The author is a constitutional attorney and litigator who serves Alliance Defending Freedom
as Vice President for Sanctity of Life in Washington, DC. The author would like to thank research
assistant Katherine Wright (U. Dayton Law '14), without whose hard work this article could not
have been completed, and Bradford Patterson, Ph.D (U. Va. Law '14), who provided invaluable
research guidance on difficult economic issues. Charles A. Donovan of Charlotte Lozier Institute
provided valuable comments to the final draft. All errors in analysis or interpretation are the author's
own.
1. This practice has been common over the forty-plus years of abortion litigation, as
evidenced in the Supreme Court briefs filed by opposing sides. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), 1971 WL 134281 (citing 25 medical and sociological
sources); Brief for Appellants, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), 1971 WL 128054
(citing 52 medical and sociological sources); but cf CLARKE D. FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION:
THE INSIDE STORY OF ROE V. WADE 169 (Encounter Books 2013) (criticizing medical sources cited
by majority opinion: "None of the [7] articles [cited by the majority] offers a real analysis of the
data; none is peer-reviewed."); Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents, Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 12006398 (citing 29
sources); Brief of the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(AAPLOG) and the American Association of Prolife Pediatricians (AAPLP) as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-
744, 91-902), 1992 WL 12006428 (citing 22 sources); Brief for the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (No. 04-1144), 2006 WL 2646471 (citing 48
sources); Brief of the Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, and John M. Thorp, Jr.,
M.D. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England,
546 U.S. 320 (2006) (No. 04-1144), 2006 WL 1902074 (citing 13 sources); Brief of Amici Curiae
American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AAPLOG), et al. Supporting
Petitioner, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-380), 2007 WL 1436688 (citing 7
sources); Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Women's Association, et al. Supporting
Respondents, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-1382), 2007 WL 2710731 (citing
35 sources).
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paradigm of federal regulation and deregulation of abortion from Roe v.
Wade2 through Planned Parenthood v. Casey,3 and raises the question
whether the federalization of abortion regulation in the period between those
decisions operated to subsidize the abortion industry; a subsidy that has
progressively come to an end in many states in the two decades since Casey
with predictable effects. The author then presents an overview of recent
economic data analyzing both the supply side of abortion, such as state
restrictions on licensing and credentialing of providers and baseline health
and safety regulations, and the demand side of abortion, such as Medicaid
funding or de-funding of elective abortion, parental involvement provisions
and state-imposed wait-and-counsel requirements.' While the conclusions
reached by researchers are sometimes tailored to an ideological position on
abortion, the data itself strongly suggest that these policy measures not only
operate according to the laws of supply and demand, they have a
demonstrable and generally predictable impact on the "elasticity" of both
supply and demand.' The author also discusses whether the data suggest that
supply or demand is more elastic in the face of regulation, which in turn
would suggest whether regulation of one or the other is more effective in
decreasing the raw number of abortions in a given state.6
2. Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
4. Used in this article, "supply-side regulations" will refer to regulations that operate on the
resources or motivation of abortion providers such as health and safety regulations, and "demand-
side regulations" will refer to those that operate on the resources or motivation of prospective
abortion patients, such as public funding rules and wait-and-counsel mandates.
5. Briefly stated, for a product or service, Price (P) is generally responsive in a linear fashion
to both Supply (S) and Demand (D) at market equilibrium. An increase in demand raises the price,
and an increase in supply lowers the price. Conversely, an increase in price lowers both demand and
supply. See, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/elasticity (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (definition number 2) (elasticity is defined as "the
responsiveness of a dependent economic variable to changes in influencing factors.").
6. Abortion regulation undoubtedly presents analytical difficulties, principally concerning
causation between abortion rates and pregnancy rates. See Andrew Yuengert & Joel Fetzer,
Economic Research into the Abortion Decision: A Literature Review and a New Direction in 1 5
LIFE AND LEARNING at 421, 432 (Joseph W. Koterski, S. et al., ed., 2005). For example, Yeungert
& Fetzer note that state Medicaid restrictions appear to decrease abortion rates even when the
restrictions have been blocked by a court - suggesting that there must be a common factor or cause
resulting in both decreased abortion rates and Medicaid restrictions. Id. While using a method of
research that compares one state to itself can help give a clearer picture of cause of effect, the
question of which came first - the demand or the supply - is not always easy to ascertain. Id., at
433. For instance, it is important to try to distinguish whether an abortion provider became available
because there was demand for abortion, or the demand for abortion increased when the abortion
provider became available. Id.
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I. DEREGULATION AND SUBSIDIZATION
From the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade' and Doe v. Bolton,'
announcing a "fundamental right" for women to choose abortion for virtually
any reason through all nine months' gestation, until the late 1980s, little
regulation of abortion was permitted by the Supreme Court as a constitutional
matter.' Insofar as surgical abortion, at least, is a form of ambulatory surgical
practice, it should predictably have been subjected upon its legalization to
health and safety regulations similarly to other outpatient practices such as
hysterectomy, tubal ligation, and vasectomy. But the Court's interventions to
protect the industry from state regulation until Webster"o in 1989, and
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
8. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
9. Roe, 410 U.S. at 166. Roe struck down the Texas abortion statutes in toto, leaving no
regulation of abortion in their place. 410 U.S. at 167 ("Our conclusion that Art. 1196 is
unconstitutional means, of course, that the Texas abortion statutes, as a unit, must fall."). Subsequent
state attempts to regulate the practice of abortion were routinely struck down or limited by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79, 83
(1976) (striking down a prohibition on saline abortions, and a requirement that the abortionist take
steps to preserve the baby's life and health); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (striking
down, as unconstitutionally vague, a Pennsylvania statute that required physicians to use the
abortion technique providing the best opportunity for the baby to be born alive in abortions if the
baby is "viable or may be viable;" holding instead that "actual viability" must be the standard);
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (holding unconstitutional
a misdemeanor ordinance that, inter alia, required all abortions performed after the first trimester of
pregnancy to be performed in a hospital; required that the attending physician inform his patient of
the status of her pregnancy, the development of her fetus, the date of possible viability, the physical
and emotional complications that may result from an abortion, and the availability of agencies to
provide her with assistance and information with respect to birth control, adoption, and childbirth,
and also inform her of the particular risks associated with her pregnancy and the abortion technique
to be employed; prohibited a physician from performing an abortion until 24 hours after the pregnant
woman signs a consent form; and required physicians performing abortions to ensure that fetal
remains are disposed of in a "humane and sanitary manner."); Planned Parenthood Association of
Kansas City, MO. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (invalidating a Missouri statute that required
all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital); Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (holding unconstitutional provisions of
Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act, including informed consent and reporting requirements). But
cf Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1975) (per curiam) (holding that state could
constitutionally restrict the practice of abortion to licensed physicians); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67
(holding Missouri could require written consent by the mother and reporting requirements for
completed abortions).
10. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 at 520-21 (1989). The Webster plurality
upheld provisions specifying that a physician, prior to performing an abortion on any woman whom
he has reason to believe is 20 or more weeks pregnant, must ascertain whether the fetus is "viable"
by performing "such medical examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of [the
fetus'] gestational age, weight, and lung maturity;" and prohibiting the use of public employees
and facilities to perform or assist abortions not necessary to save the mother's life or the use of
public funds, employees, or facilities for the purpose of "encouraging or counseling" a woman to
have an abortion not necessary to save her life. 492 U.S. at 520. The plurality stated, "There is no
doubt that our holding today will allow some governmental regulation of abortion that would have
been prohibited under the language of cases such as Colautti and Akron." Id. at 520-21.
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Planned Parenthood v. Casey" in 1992, effectively withheld a substantial
portion of the burden of regulatory compliance from providers entering the
market, artificially elevating the number of providers and lowering barriers
to entry for substandard practitioners. Webster and Casey largely put an end
to the Court's interventionist policy, resulting in an increasingly regulated
abortion market over the past twenty years.12
The well-known economic principle of Gresham's Law, roughly
paraphrased, states that when a government overvalues one type of money
and undervalues another, the undervalued money will disappear from
circulation into hoards, while the overvalued money will flood the market.'I
It is commonly stated as, "Bad money drives out good." Gresham's Law has
been applied by analogy to circumstances where governmental behavior
towards a market has the unintended effect of subsidizing weaker competitors
to the detriment of consumers. 4 The impact of unintentional subsidization of
an abortion market seems to have operated as a "Gresham's Law of Bad
Medicine." It can be seen most clearly in the history and prosecution of Dr.
Kermit Gosnell in Philadelphia and its aftermath. According to the grand
jury that indicted Kermit Gosnell," resulting ultimately in his conviction on
three counts of murder, one count of involuntary manslaughter, and other
lesser counts,'" the Department of Health's determination not to inspect
I1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 at 878-99 (1992) (citing Roe, 410
U.S. at 164-65) (upholding a Pennsylvania law requiring informed consent, and a 24-hour waiting
period before the abortion was to be performed, as well as a parental consent mandate where a
judicial bypass was also available).
12. ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., AN OVERVIEW OF STATE ABORTION LAWS, State Policies in
Brief(2013); Seeinfra notes 116,121; Michael J. New, Ph.D, Analyzing the Effect ofAnti-Abortion
U.S. State Legislation in the Post-Casey Era, II ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 28 (2011); S. Colman and T.
Joyce, Regulating Abortion: Impact on Patients and Providers in Texas, 30 J. OF POL'Y ANALYSIS
AND MGMT. 775 (2011).
13. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (1 Ith ed. 2009), available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gresham's%201aw.
14. Id. ("[Biroadly: any process by which inferior products or practices drive out superior
ones .... Gresham's Law has been applied by analogy to a wide range of human conduct. In its
expanded formulation, it stands for the proposition that greed tends to overwhelm refined human
impulses for good in a marketplace economy."); See also Michael J. McIntyre, Offshore Banking
and Gresham's Law, 2 TAX NOTES INT'L 819-21 (1990) (analogizing Gresham's Law to the context
of offshore banking regulation); Jonathan A. Lesser, Gresham's Law of Green Energy, REG., at 12
(2010-2011) ("In effect, 'green' energy mandates like those of California and New Jersey are a new
version of 'Gresham's Law,' in which subsidized renewable resources will drive out competitive
generators, lead to higher electric prices, and reduce economic growth.").
15. REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY, IN RE CNTY. INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY XXIII, MISC.
No. 0009901-2008 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 14, 2011), available at,
http://www.phila.gov/distr-ictattorney/pdfs/grandjurywomensmedical.pdf
16. Brady Dennis, Abortion Doctor Kermit Gosnell Convicted of Murder in Deaths of Three
Infants, WASHINGTON
POST (May 13, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/jury-in-kermit-
gosnell-trial-hung-on-two-charges/2013/05/13/b4444bdc-bbda-I e2-
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abortion clinics in the state and to ignore evidence that was presented against
Gosnell's clinic was "motivated by a desire not to be 'putting a barrier up to
women' seeking abortions.""
The impact of increased regulation of the abortion industry since Webster
and Casey may demonstrate what happens when states no longer "overvalue"
abortion access because of a misplaced belief that as a constitutionally
protected right, it cannot be subjected to informed consent, health, and safety
regulations, and instead subject market participants to reasonable and
constitutional mandates such as full informed consent laws, 8 parental
involvement laws,' 9 wait-and-counsel requirements,2 o and ambulatory
surgical provider regulations.2' The impact of the new regime in which states
no longer indirectly subsidize abortion practice by withholding regulatory
mandates that would have otherwise applied to them is becoming apparent as
waves of abortion providers, led by larger providers, have exited the industry
and demand for abortion has also dropped precipitously.
II. ABORTION AS AN ECONOMIC MARKET
Elective abortion as a licit business dates from the constitutionalization
of abortion in all fifty states in 1973 through the Supreme Court's Roe v.
Wade decision.22 Abortion researcher Andrew Beauchamp of Boston College
notes that initially, there was mass entry into the abortion market during the
1970s after the legalization of abortion.23 This trend reversed in the early
1990s as providers began exiting the market, starting with hospitals and with
small providers following suit.24 Abortion prices rose across the board as the
market became dominated by large providers and supply dropped.25 This was
largely because state regulations had the most significant impact on small
97d4a479289a3 I f9_story.html.
17. Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 15, at 147.
18. Casey, supra note 3, at 833; Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d
724 (8th Cir. 2008); Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th
Cir. 2012).
19. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 511 (1990); Fargo Women's Health
Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546
U.S. 320 (2006).
20. Casey, supra note 3.
21. Id; Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999); Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant,
222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000); Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004).
22. Roe, supra note 2.
23. Andrew Beauchamp, Abortion Supplier Dynamics 12 (revised March 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Boston College) available at http://neumann.hec.calpages/
pierre-thomas.leger/andrew.pdf (using data from a survey of abortion trends from 1973-2005, and
a model of entry, exit, and provision to explain the interplay between state regulations and supply
and demand in abortion markets).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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providers (those who perform less than 400 abortions per year).26 Moreover,
Beauchamp observes that when a provider leaves a market, it is generally not
replaced, meaning that both supply-side restrictions and a reduction in
demand are likely making that market not worthwhile.2 7 Likewise, state laws
that required abortion providers to obtain licenses-either to practice
medicine, register as a surgical center, or otherwise-increased the cost of
entering the market, resulting in keeping small providers out.28 The decrease
in small providers had the effect of driving down competition, increasing the
price of abortion, and decreasing the overall number of abortions.
Additionally, regulations requiring hospitalization at some point in the
second trimester were noted to have reduced marginal costs for large
providers, because they no longer provide late-term abortion services.29 But
they have increased entry costs for large providers that seek to provide late-
term services.30
Planned Parenthood Federation of America ("PPFA" or "Planned
Parenthood") emerged as the market leader for abortion services from this
period of market instability, and its trajectory is emblematic of the maturation
of the abortion market as a whole. In 1973, Planned Parenthood affiliates
performed only 4,988, or .67 percent of all U.S. abortions; twenty years later,
its market share still remained relatively low at less than ten percent.3 ' During
the post-Casey era, however, its share of the abortion market surged to 31.59
percent by 2011, as its affiliates performed 333,946 abortions of the reported
1.057 million U.S. procedures. 32 Since Casey, there has never been a close
second to Planned Parenthood in market share for abortion.
PPFA is the oldest U.S. reproductive healthcare organization, dating to a
merger in 1939 of two organizations founded by birth control advocate
Margaret Sanger. Planned Parenthood played a role in the development of
chemical birth control and the Intrauterine Device (IUD) beginning in the
26. Id. at 15; JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHSOF ABORTION HISTORY 710
(2006), (citing Sara Seims, Abortion Availability in the U.S., 12 FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 88,
95 (1980).
27. Beauchamp, supra note 23, at 40; See also Esme E. Deprez, The Vanishing Abortion
Clinic, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articies/201
3-11-27/abortion-clinics-face-shutdown-spiral-as-republicans-push-restrictions (noting a "tidal
wave" of clinic closures, with very few new clinics replacing ones that have gone out of business).
28. Beauchamp, supra note 23, at 5.
29. Id. at 28.
30. Id. at 33.
31. Alliance Defending Freedom, Planned Parenthood by the Numbers,
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/plannedparenthoodnumbers.pdf.
32. Id.
33. V. Kasturi Rangan and Elaine V. Backman, Planned Parenthood Federation ofAmerica,
Harv. Bus. Sch. Case Study No. 9-598-001 (1997; rev'd. 2002) at 9, Ex. 1-"Planned Parenthood
History."
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1960s, and promoted their use in the U.S. and the developing world.34
Beginning in 1978 with the election of Faye Wattleton as the federation
president, PPFA became more active in the legal battle over abortion."
PPFA is organized as a membership corporation with national offices
headquartered in Washington, D.C. and New York City.3 6 The Federation
appears to possess some characteristics of a franchise: affiliates pay an annual
dues premium to the national office that is scaled to the size of the affiliate's
budget, in return for which affiliates are entitled to the use of the Planned
Parenthood brand, representation at PPFA membership meetings, and access
to the services provided by the national office." The national office sets
mandatory medical standards for the affiliate network for reproductive
healthcare delivery, provides technical, managerial, legal and advocacy
training and support for affiliates, and offers a central medical malpractice
insurance policy for affiliates through a captive offshore insurer and other
private insurers." Each local affiliate is organized as an independent,
charitable nonprofit corporation governed by a local board.39 Affiliates
commit to operate according to PPFA standards for affiliation, which include
medical standards and operating guidelines covering governance,
managerial, and financial matters.4 o A series of Harvard Business School
studies of PPFA between 1997 and 2010 found that affiliate revenues came
from a variety of sources, the leading source being private fee-for-service
payments (39 percent of total affiliate revenue).4 1 Medicaid payments
accounted for 25 percent of affiliate income, and government grants,
particularly Title X-Federal Family Planning, accounted for 15 percent.42
PPFA's affiliate structure and hierarchical management have likely lent
several competitive advantages to the organization that have contributed to
its domination of the abortion market. Its non-profit group exemption, in
addition to enabling its affiliates to solicit private tax-deductible
contributions, allows it to operate free of federal, state, and local income and
excise taxes on income from clinical services, and in most jurisdictions has
probably granted it exemptions from real property taxes on owned property.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 10.
36. Id. at 3 (referencing Washington, D.C.). PPFA's recent 990 filings list New York offices.
37. Id. at 2; see generally Howard Yale Lederman, Franchising and Franchise Law: An
Introduction, 92 MICH. B. J. 34, 34 (2013) ("The franchisor licenses to the franchisee, for a defined
period, the right to use the franchisor's business model and intellectual property-such as signs and
logos, trademarks and service marks, business plans, and operations manuals-necessary to operate
the business. The franchisor also provides marketing and sales assistance, training, and other support
to promote and grow the brand.").
38. Rangan & Backman, supra note 33, at 2.
39. Id. at 1-2.
40. Id. at 2.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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By empowering the federation to negotiate for medical supplies and
medications as a large-volume provider, inventory costs are presumably
lower relative to similar for-profit providers. And its affiliation structure
provides many of the benefits of a franchise operation-well-developed
trademarks and concomitant goodwill, financial and medical management
procedures, marketing, sales assistance and training. As a franchise scholar
observes, "A vast distribution system can be quickly accomplished with a
relatively [low investment] in sales outlets."43
Harvard noted that during the late 1970s and the 1980s, PPFA had
"experienced rapid growth, with annual revenues exploding from $80 million
to over $400 million between 1978 and 1990."44 At the beginning of that
period, PPFA believed that its high name-recognition and reputation in the
reproductive health services market "positioned it to expand its share of this
large healthcare market." 45 "By the 1990s, however, PPFA revenue growth
had flattened, and beginning in 1993 [the year after Casey] the net margin
had begun to decline." 46 The Harvard study in 1994 found Planned
Parenthood to be an organization in a state of flux, with "a great deal of
variation among the local affiliates" both in size and scope of medical
services offered. 47 At that time, PPFA included 163 local affiliates, 48 but
between 1994 and 2012, roughly the period from the beginning of Casey's
regime of deregulation to the present, that total had shrunk to 94 under a wave
of consolidations and closings.4 9
Harvard concluded that "[s]ome of the decline in revenue growth was
due to demographic shifts, as the number of women in their younger
reproductive years (under 25) declined."o Affiliate fundraising dropped by
about five percent in 1993 from a peak of $120 million in 1992, and national
fundraising was also declining.5 ' Planned Parenthood insiders preferred to
point to the rise of managed care, which was replacing traditional medical
indemnity plans with systems that emphasized centralized decision making
about health care decisions and referrals for specialized care.52 Most managed
43. J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-ins, 58
CAL. L. R. 1085, 1087 (1970).
44. Rangan & Backman, supra note 33, at 4.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1.
49. Alliance Defending Freedom, supra note 31.
50. Rangan & Backman, supra note 33, at 4. It seems evident that since Roe legalized abortion
in 1973, Planned Parenthood's target clientele-women ages 18 through 44-would have begun to
decline demographically beginning 18 years later, in 1991. Thus, Harvard may have been speaking
euphemistically when it remarked, "demographic shifts were clearly affecting clinic revenue."
51. Id. at 8.
52. Rangan & Backman, supra note 33, at 4-5 (stating that between 1980 and 1991, the
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care systems provided the preventive care that Planned Parenthood affiliates
offered. They preferred not to refer patients out of the system to third-party
specialized providers like Planned Parenthood, preferring OB/GYN
specialists to family planning clinics because physician specialists offered a
broader range of specialty services than PPFA clinics." Because Planned
Parenthood operated "out of the medical mainstream,"5 4 changes wrought by
managed care threatened the financial foundation of Planned Parenthood."
Harvard notes that PPFA responded to these challenges in a number of
ways. The federation voted to reframe PPFA's slogan, which had been
centered on securing access for reproductive healthcare, in favor of one that
promised to be "America's most trusted provider of reproductive care. . ."
Following that "rebranding" process, a number of affiliates sought to attract
more affluent patients and tested new markets in order to develop sources of
subsidization for their traditional medical services to indigents." Criticism of
these directions came from within and from outside of the organization.
According to the Associated Press, a confidential letter was sent by Planned
Parenthood clinic executives in New York City, Chicago and Los Angeles to
affiliates complaining, "[n]ever has a document [i.e., the rebranding
proposal] seemed so out of touch with our mission . . . ."" "'The word
'abortion' is mentioned only eight times'," the letter reportedly said, "'and
never in the discussion of our future."' 59 Competitors have been critical of
PPFA's new businesslike market strategy; one operator of an independent
chain of abortion clinics in Texas and Maryland, Amy Hagstrom-Miller, was
quoted by the Wall Street Journal as saying, "This is not the Planned
Parenthood we all grew up with . . . they now have more of a business
approach, much more aggressive."60 The Wall Street Journal provides
context for Hagstrom-Miller's frustration. "Ms. Hagstrom-Miller competes
percentage of Americans enrolled in managed care grew from 4 percent to 15.1 percent, with 35
percent of enrollees in the Pacific region in 1992).
53. Id. at 5-6 (stating managed care companies preferred to contract with larger organizations
or organizations with sophisticated information and billing systems that many smaller Planned
Parenthood affiliates lacked).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 6 (stating managed care threatened PPFA in several ways, according to the Harvard
study: First, by reducing the pool of individuals with private insurance that did not cover
contraceptives; second, by increasing competition for Medicaid patients as managed care drove
down public healthcare costs and more providers were able to afford the Medicaid reimbursement
rates for public health patients; and third, by increasing the number of uninsured individuals, thereby
increasing demand for Planned Parenthood affiliates to partially subsidize services).
56. Stephanie Simon, Planned Parenthood Hits Suburbia, WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE
(June 23, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 121417762585295459.
57. Id.; E.g., Michael Blood, Planned Parenthood Debates a New Focus: Primary Care,
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995, available at
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19950302&slug=2107745.
58. Blood, supra note 57; Rangan & Backman, supra note 33, at 2.
59. Id.
60. Simon, supra note 56.
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with Planned Parenthood for abortion patients-and finds it deeply
frustrating. She does not receive the government grants or tax-deductible
contributions that bolster Planned Parenthood, and says she can't match the
nonprofit's budget for advertising or clinic upgrades."" Hagstrom-Miller
concludes, "[t]hey're not unlike other big national chains .... They put local
independent businesses in a tough situation."62
III. SUPPLY-SIDE ABORTION REGULATION: LICENSING, CREDENTIALING,
AND HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATIONS
In 2013, Bloomberg Businessweek recorded, "Amy Hagstrom-Miller
fired 34 people in November,"6 3 and further, Hagstrom-Miller "had to stop
or sharply curtail abortions at four of her six Texas clinics because a new
state law requires doctors performing the procedure to have admitting
privileges at local hospitals."' Overall, "[a]t least twelve clinics in Texas
have closed their doors or stopped offering the procedure in the past month
after a federal appeals court and the U.S. Supreme Court let the new statute
take effect."65 The journal chronicled a wave of state regulations that have
made it increasingly difficult for small and independent operators like
Hagstrom-Miller to stay open. Since 2011, 30 states have passed 203 abortion
restrictions." At least seventy-three clinics have reportedly closed or stopped
doing abortions." Businessweek estimates that new laws were responsible
for roughly half the closures, with declining demand, consolidation, and
crackdowns also contributing." In this instance, surgical center regulations
were a potent force: "Laws aimed at the clinics, such as mandates to widen
hallways and install high-tech surgical scrub sinks, are proving more
powerful than those aimed at patients, such as waiting periods or parental
notification requirements.""
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Esme E. Deprez, The Vanishing Abortion Clinic, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 27,
2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-11-27/abortion-clinics-face-shutdown-spiral-
as-republicans-push-restrictions.
64. Id.
65. Id; See also Planned Parenthood v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Tex. 2013)
emergency stay granted in part, 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir.), mot'n to stay den d, 134 S.Ct. 506 (2013),
- F.3d -, 2014 WL 1257965 (Mar. 27, 2014) (affirming in part, reversing in part and
remanding).
66. Deprez, supra note 63.
67. Id; See also Esme E. Deprez, Abortion Clinics Close at Record Pace After States Tighten
Rules, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sep. 03, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-
03/abortion-clinics-close-at-record-pace-afiter-states-tighten-rules.html.
68. Deprez, supra note 63.
69. Id. (litigation over surgical center regulations continues apace, with admitting privileges
requirements currently taking center stage); See, e.g, Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Van
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As noted above, medical licensing mandates for abortion physicians,
credentialing requirements such as mandating admitting privileges, and
ambulatory surgical center regulations have a substantial impact upon the
cost of doing business for abortion providers, and thus reduce the number of
providers entering and staying in the market. Abortion researcher Andrew
Beauchamp concludes that 22 percent of the decline in abortions from 199 1-
2005, covering much of the post-Casey era, was due to state regulations, with
supply-side regulations decreasing abortions by 3.2 percent annually."
Theodore Joyce of the Guttmacher Institute and his colleagues studied
the impact of earlier surgical center regulations in Texas, which in 2004
passed a law mandating that after 15 weeks abortions must be performed in
surgical centers." Because none of the 56 Texas abortion providers qualified
as surgical centers, the effective result was to make abortions after 15 weeks
unavailable in Texas. Abortions among Texas residents after 15 weeks fell
by 64 percent in the first year.72 While the number of Texas residents
obtaining late-term abortions out-of-state tripled, less than five percent of
abortions for Texas residents were performed at 16 weeks or after. 3
IV. DEMAND-SIDE ABORTION REGULATION
In economic research and analysis, abortion is typically viewed as a form
of insurance against having "unwanted children."74 However, research has
indicated that a decrease in abortion rates does not always lead to an increase
in birth rates." Rather, decreases in abortion can be correlated with a decrease
in pregnancy rates.76 Yuengert and Fetzer postulate that the same factors that
discourage abortion likely discourage pregnancy.77 Thus, when abortion costs
Hollen, 963 F.Supp.2d 858 (W.D. Wis. 2013), Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van
Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238 (W.D.Wis. Aug 02, 2013) (NO. 13-CV-465-WMC), affd, Planned
Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. Dec 20, 2013), Petition for
Certiorari Filed, 82 USLW 3591 (Mar 19, 2014) (NO. 13-1127); Jackson Women's Health Org. v.
Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 420 (S.D. Miss. 2013); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, 951
F. Supp. 2d 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2013), Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. Strange, 2014 WL
1320158 (M.D.Ala. Mar 31, 2014) (denying motions for summary judgment and setting trial).
70. Beauchamp, supra note 23, at 40 (suggesting that the remaining percentage is due to
contraception, an increase in desired pregnancies and a decrease in unwanted pregnancies).
71. Colman & Joyce, supra note 12, at 806.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Yuengert & Fetzer, supra note 6, at 422.
75. Id. at 423.
76. Id. at 425 (concluding that legal abortion has reduced birth rates by eight percent, but has
increased the pregnancy rate).
77. Id.; accord Beauchamp, supra note 23, at 8 (stating that the fact that both birth and abortion
rates fall when the travel distance to a provider increases demonstrates that the same factors that
reduce abortions also reduce pregnancies).
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increase slightly, they predict that both abortion and birth rates will fall. 8
This effect seems limited, because when abortion costs increase heavily, the
abortion rate will fall and the birth rate will rise.79
Using economic variables from three decades, ten years apart, Marshall
Medoff of Long Beach State and his co-authors added abortion price to the
demand equation in order to explore how abortion restrictions, abortion price,
and income affect demand.so Medoff found that there is generally greater
demand for abortion among women in the workforce and lower demand
among educated and evangelical women." Medoff found demand for
abortion is more sensitive to price than previous research indicated.82 Further,
the price of abortion also may alter a woman's decision to avoid becoming
pregnant in the first place." When abortion costs increase, women may
engage in pregnancy-avoiding behavior, driving down abortion demand,
Medoff concludes.
A brief look at the microeconomics of abortion helps explain why this is
so. Rachel Jones and her co-authors at the Guttmacher Institute conducted a
voluntary poll of 639 women at six abortion clinics in diverse locations to
examine how women pay for abortion.8 ' The study indicated that women with
private health insurance are more likely to pay for abortions out of pocket
than women with Medicaid. 6 While 64 percent of women polled had
insurance, 69 percent of them did not use their insurance to cover the
abortion." Among women who did not use private insurance, half said that it
was difficult to find the money to pay for the abortion." Women covered by
Medicaid were half as likely to pay for an abortion out-of-pocket as women
with private insurance.89
In a review of prior literature, Jones and her co-authors found that in
78. Yuengert & Fetzer, supra note 6, at 424-29 (asserting demand is related to supply as well,
since research has demonstrated that access to providers increases abortion rates); See also
Beauchamp, supra note 23, at 40.
79. Yuengert & Fetzer, supra note 6, at 424-29.
80. Marshall H. Medoff, Price, Restrictions and Abortion Demand, 28 J. OF FAM. ECON. ISS.
583 at 583 (2007).
81. Id. at 591; accord Beauchamp, supra note 23, at 26 (noting that factors such as religious
and ethnic composition can vary demand, and that inclusion of those variables is essential to
studying impacts on demand).
82. Medoff, supra note 80, at 592-93.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Rachel K. Jones et al., At what cost?: Payment for abortion care, WOMEN'S HEALTH
ISSUES, May 7, 2013.
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 9.
89. Id. at 2.
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2008, 20 percent of total U.S. abortions were covered by Medicaid,90 and
those took place only in the 17 states that provide Medicaid coverage for
abortion.9 1 Only 12 percent of U.S. abortions in 2008 were paid for with
private insurance. 92 Half of the women polled received assistance, either from
an abortion fund, from a male partner, a family member, a discount from the
abortion provider, or other sources.93 Without counting those who had no out-
of-pocket costs, the average price was $485.94 Including the 21 percent of
those women who had no out-of-pocket costs, the average price paid was
$382." The average cost for second-trimester abortions was $854.96
There are also hidden costs imposed by abortion. The average amount
of lost wages attributed to abortion costs (such as childcare, transportation
and taking time off work) was $198, according to Jones.97 Two-thirds of
women were affected by the $44 average cost of traveling to an abortion
provider.9 8
Medicaid Funding
It is generally recognized that the availability of state Medicaid funding
results in increased abortion demand.99 In 2001, six states implemented
expanded Medicaid programs that provided family planning funding for
individuals with incomes too high for overall Medicaid eligibility."oo By
2006, eight more states offered expansion programs for abortion and family
planning.o' Since 1994, Medicaid spending on family planning has tripled in
those 14 states. 102 Between the state and federal governments, $89 million
was spent on 177,000 abortions in 2006."03 Nearly all of that money was spent
90. Id. at 3.
91. Jones et al., supra note 85.
92. Id.; see generally Alan Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief Restricting Insurance
Coverage of Abortion, Nov. 1, 2003 at I (explaining eight states restrict insurance coverage of
abortion in all private insurance plans written in the state, including those offered through the health
insurance exchanges under the federal health care reform law, twenty-four restrict abortion coverage
in plans that will be offered through the insurance exchanges created by the Affordable Care Act,
and eighteen restrict abortion coverage in insurance plans for public employees).
93. Alan Guttmacher Institute, supra note 92, at 1.
94. Id.
95. Jones et al., supra note 85, at 9.
96. Id.
97. Tara Culp-Ressler, By the Numbers: Why Most U.S. Women Struggle to Afford Abortion,
THINK PROGRESS (May 8, 2013, 11:20 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/05/08/1979831/
women-struggle-to-afford-abortion.
98. Id.
99. Medoff, supra note 80, at 593; ADAM SONFIELD, ET AL., GUTrMACHER INST., PUBLIC
FUNDING FOR FAMILY PLANNING, STERILIZATION AND ABORTION SERVICES FY 1980-2006,
Occasional Report No. 38 (2008).
100. SONFIELD, ET AL., supra note 99, at 6.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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in the 17 states with nonrestrictive abortion policies allowing Medicaid to
cover nearly all "medically necessary" abortions, and nearly all of the
abortions were covered by state dollars.'04 Comparing the results of a 2006
survey of public expenditures for family planning with surveys from prior
years, Adam Sonfield and his co-authors at the Guttmacher Institute
demonstrated the growth of public spending on abortion in these 17 states
with nonrestrictive abortion funding policies.' In those states, the inclusion
of family planning has substantially increased the Medicaid client base,
compared to more restrictive states. 106
Conversely, there is general agreement that state Medicaid restrictions
decrease abortion rates. Marshall Medoff of Long Beach State believes that
Medicaid restrictions substantially reduce the number of unintended
pregnancies that end in abortion. While Medicaid restrictions reduce the rate
of terminations of unintended pregnancies by 10.7 per 1,000 women, the
restrictions reduce the ratio of abortions to unintended pregnancies by 121.5
per 1,000 unintended pregnancies. 0 7 Therefore, Medoff concludes, Medicaid
restrictions have less effect on sexual behavior and more effect on what
women decide to do after they become unintentionally pregnant.
Stanley Henshaw of the Guttmacher Institute and his co-authors in 2009
utilized 38 studies, ranging from the years 1979-2008, to demonstrate the
national and statewide effects of restrictions on Medicaid funding for elective
abortion.'os Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have restricted the
use of Medicaid dollars to abortion cases involving life endangerment and
rape.o' Studies found that among Medicaid-restricted states, there were 16.4
abortions per 1,000 women of childbearing age."o That ratio was
substantially less than in the 17 Medicaid-expanded states, where there were
24.1 abortions per 1,000 women."' Henshaw and his co-authors concluded
that among pregnancies that would have been eligible for Medicaid-funded
abortion, between 18 and 37 percent were carried to term when funding was
104. Id. at 10.
105. Id. at 7.
106. SONFIELD ET AL., supra note 99, at 7.
107. Marshall H. Medoff, Unintended Pregnancies, Restrictive Abortion Laws, and Abortion
Demand, ISRN ECON., 2012, at 5 [hereinafter Medoff, Unintended Pregnancies] (noting that
abortion is a function of unintended pregnancies, using data from a state-specific survey and
plugging it into an empirical formula that demonstrated the changes in abortion rate, to examine the
impact of abortion price and state restrictions on unintended pregnancies); See also Medoff, supra
note 80, at 596 (concluding that in states where state Medicaid funding is available for abortions,
demand increased by 3.3 percent, but with a much more significant impact among minors).
108. STANLEY HENSHAW, ET AL., GUrMACHER INST., RESTRICTIONSONMEDIcAIDFUvDING
FOR ABORTIONS; A LITERATURE REVIEW, 2009.
109. Id. at 1.
I 10. Id. at 9.
111. Id.
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unavailable.1 12 While the results showed no significant increase in birth rates
for low-income women," 3 among teenagers and adults Medicaid restrictions
resulted in an overall reduction in the number of pregnancies that end in
abortion." 4 Unlike Medoff, the authors found it inconclusive whether
restrictions reduce pregnancy rates for teenagers or adults."'
Parental Involvement Laws
As of 2007, 35 states mandated some form of parental involvement in a
minor's decision to have an abortion." 6 Of these, 22 required some form of
consent by one or both parents, while 11 states required parental notification
only."'7 In keeping with Supreme Court decisions prohibiting states from
allowing parental "vetos" over the abortion decision, all states that have
enforceable parental involvement statutes also maintain some form of
judicial bypass procedure."'
Some scholars, such as Long Beach State's Medoff, believe that parental
notification mandates have little to no effect on overall abortion rates, but are
connected with lower pregnancy rates." 9 Dr. Michael New's recent
comprehensive analysis of minor abortion data from nearly all fifty states
between 1985 and 1999, however, demonstrates that parental involvement
laws, once enacted, cause abortion rates to fall by an average of
112. Id. at 27.
113. Id.
114. HENSHAW, ET AL., supra note 108, at 27-8.
115. Id.
116. GUTrMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN
MINORS' ABORTIONS, 2014 at 1, available at, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib
PIMA.pdf.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
("[Tihe State may not impose a blanket provision .. . . requiring the consent of a parent .. . . as a
condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy."); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) ( "[I]f the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain
one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby
authorization for the abortion can be obtained."); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 450 (1990)
("[T]he requirement that both parents be notified, whether or not both wish to be notified or have
assumed responsibility for the upbringing of the child, does not reasonably further any legitimate
state interest."); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 511 (1990) (upholding a
parental consent requirement that included a judicial bypass procedure); H. L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398, 409 (1981) ("A statute setting out a 'mere requirement of parental notice' does not violate
the constitutional rights of an immature, dependent minor.").
119. Medoff, Unintended Pregnancies, supra, note 107, at 5 (suggesting that parental
involvement statutes have a "spillover effect" as they result in permanent changes in teenagers'
sexual behavior, which include avoiding risky sexual behavior, follow them into adulthood and
serve to continue driving down the number of unintended pregnancies); But see Medoff, supra note
80, at 596-97 (finding that parental involvement statutes had small to no impact on the general
number of abortions, but parental consent, parental notification and parental involvement were
significantly related to reduced abortion demand among minors, reducing demand by four to five
percent).
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approximately 13.6 percent.120
Wait-and-Counsel Mandates
A majority of states require counseling for women considering
abortion.12 ' As of 2013, 35 states require that women receive counseling
before an abortion, with 25 states requiring specific information about the
procedure, including the ability of the fetus to feel pain (12); psychological
impacts of abortion (22), and the link between abortion and decreased
resistance to breast cancer (7).122 Twenty-six of these states also mandate that
women wait a specified period, usually 24 hours, between the counseling and
the abortion.'23
A diversity of opinion exists over the efficacy of wait-and-counsel
mandates in reducing abortion rates. Yuengert and Fetzer's review of
economic literature concludes that informed consent and mandatory waiting
periods decrease abortion rates, and abortion policies in general affect
pregnancy rates, contraception use and marriage. 2" Andrew Beauchamp
believes that on the demand side, only waiting period laws have been shown
to decrease the number of abortions.' Marshall Medoff demurs, concluding
that mandatory counseling and waiting periods have no statistically
significant effect on the rate or ratio of abortions to unintended
pregnancies.'26
Theodore Joyce and his Guttmacher Institute co-authors reviewed 12
studies on waiting period and mandatory counseling laws.'27 Four out of six
studies found a significant reduction in abortion rates based on mandatory
counseling and waiting period laws, while two did not.'28 The most important
variable, according to the authors, was whether the law required a woman to
make at least two visits to the provider before obtaining an abortion.'2 9 Laws
which require two visits to an abortion provider are substantially related to
reduced abortions, they concluded, while laws that enable one visit have no
120. New, supra note 12.
121. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: MANDATORY COUNSELING AND
WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION, Dec. 1, 2013, at 7, available at, http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/spibs/spibMWPA.pdf.
122. Id.
123. Id; Planned Parenthood Minnesota, N. Dakota, S. Dakota v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d
1048 (D.S.D. 2011) (South Dakota mandated a 72-hour waiting period, but that provision was
enjoined in litigation).
124. Yuengert & Fetzer, supra note 6, at 429.
125. Beauchamp, supra note 23, at 25.
126. Medoff, supra note 80, at 593.
127. THEODORE J. JOYCE ET AL., GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF STATE
MANDATORY COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIOD LAWS ON ABORTION, 2009.
128. Id. at 7.
129. Id. at 9.
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statistically significant impact on abortion rates.1o Likewise, they concluded
that laws that allow for counseling via telephone or that only require a one-
hour waiting period do not have a statistically significant impact on abortion
rates or delays.13 1
One study surveyed by Joyce's team examined abortion rates before and
after a 24-hour waiting period law was implemented in Mississippi,132
effectively requiring a woman to make two separate visits to the provider in
order to obtain an abortion.13 The actual number of abortions in Mississippi
was 22 percent lower than expected based on previous years.'34 Abortions
performed in Mississippi on out-of-state residents fell by 30 percent, while
abortions obtained by Mississippi residents out of state increased by 17
percent. '3 The study concluded that the law resulted in approximately 11-13
percent fewer abortions.136
Joyce and his co-authors concluded that abortion rates will likely
decrease in a state requiring more than one visit to a provider, especially if
neighboring states have similar restrictions."' However, Medoff, Joyce, and
others agree that women are willing to travel across state lines to avoid their
state's restrictions and obtain an abortion.13 1
V. CONCLUSION
The impact of making abortion effectively unavailable, either
geographically as clinics close, or by regulatory processes, is much debated.
Theodore Joyce and his Guttmacher Institute colleagues studied abortion and
birth rates before and after Roe's legalization of abortion in 1973 to examine
how abortion rates may be impacted by regulations that increase the distance
to a legal provider.'39 Prior to the national legalization of abortion in 1973,
tens of thousands of women traveled to "legal abortion" states to obtain
abortion.'4 0 For instance, in 1971 and 1972, 29,227 women traveled from
Michigan to New York to obtain abortions.' 4 ' After abortion became legal in
every state and more widely available, travel to New York fell dramatically
among abortion-minded women, largely among non-whites, low-income
130. Id at 15.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 7.
133. Joyce et al., supra note 127, at 7.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Medoff, supra note 80, at 593; Ted Joyce et al., Back to the Future? Abortion Before and
After Roe, 32 J. HEALTH EcON. 815 (2013) [hereinafter Joyce et al., Abortion Before and After Roe].
139. Joyce et al., Abortion Before and After Roe, supra note 138, at 804.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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women and young women.'42 While long distances to abortion providers
were connected with high teen birth rates before Roe, after abortion became
legal, distance only had a moderate impact on teen birth rates. 4 3 Based on
these findings, the authors posit that efforts to reduce providers and increase
distances will have more of an impact on teenagers, non-whites and low-
income women.'" Joyce and his co-authors conclude that if abortion
providers decrease, the vast majority of women will still travel to states where
abortion is available."' "What is apparent from the pre-Roe abortion data,"
Joyce states, "is that although distance matters, women were willing to travel
hundreds of miles to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. We predict that most
women would continue to travel long distances to terminate a pregnancy, if
abortion were no longer legal in their state." 46
Thus, despite the demonstrable impact of abortion regulations on supply
and demand for abortion, abortion advocates and opponents should recognize
that there are limits to their effectiveness. State activity and political debate
over this issue are unlikely to end, whether extreme regulation or extreme
deregulation occurs. The latter goal is typically embodied in efforts to pass a
federal Freedom of Choice Act ("FOCA"). Introduced in 2004, FOCA would
have resulted in courts overturning nearly all state abortion regulations, with
the exception of the physician requirement for surgical abortions. Andrew
Beauchamp of Boston College simulated passage of such a law.'4 7 Plugging
the FOCA scenario into his supply-and-demand equations, the author
determined that the number of large providers would remain the same, while
the number of small providers would increase by 11 percent and hospital
providers would increase by 13 percent.14 Abortions would increase only by
6.6 percent, Beauchamp concluded.'49 The author posited that removing state
regulations would only moderately affect access to abortions because the
decline in access is mainly due to shifts in demand.' Even the entry of new
providers under the simulated scenario took place in existing markets instead
of creating new markets. 151
On the other end of the political spectrum, studies have attempted to
simulate the resulting regime of state abortion regulation if Roe v. Wade were
142. Id. at 805.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Joyce et al., Abortion Before and After Roe, supra note 138, at 815.
146. Id.
147. Beauchamp, supra note 23, at 37.
148. Id. at 38.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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overturned by the Supreme Court and the issue returned to the states.152
Theodore Joyce and his co-authors computed the change in distance to the
nearest legal provider under several scenarios and applied their pre-Roe
estimates to predict changes in abortion and birth rates.'13 One scenario
assumed that only 20 states with state constitutional protections for abortion
or with historically strong support for the practice would continue to permit
it.154 Another assumed that abortion was banned or extremely restricted in
17 states: those with bans pre-dating Roe or statutes that would ban abortion
if Roe was overturned, and states that have signaled a desire to restrict
abortion to the maximum legally possible.' 5 The authors concluded that
nationally, abortions would be expected to fall by 14.9 percent under the first
scenario of a 31-state ban (including the District of Columbia), but only by
6.0 percent under the latter scenario of a 17-state ban.1 16
The fact that these projections predict roughly a 12 to 21 percent swing
in abortion between a regime of unregulable abortion, and one of state
plenary authority to regulate, strongly suggests that the potential impact of
abortion regulation is contained within a fairly narrow band of net change.
The lesson taught by the data and conclusions contained in the studies
reviewed herein seems to be that legal and cultural efforts to reduce abortion
on the demand side are likely to have a greater long-term impact on the
abortion rate than legislative efforts to restrict supply, although clearly both
approaches are working in tandem to lower the overall national abortion rate.
152. See, e.g., Joyce et al., Abortion Before & After Roe, supra note 138; Levine, Phillip et al.,
Roe v. Wade and American Fertility, 89 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 199 (1999).
153. Joyce et al., Abortion Before & After Roe, supra note 138, at 3-21 (projecting as to which
states would likely ban or restrict abortion came from analyses provided by the Center for
Reproductive Rights, NARAL Pro-Choice America and the Guttmacher Institute).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
